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Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and
Fiduciary Administration
by Mary F. Radford
This Article describes selected cases and significant legislation from
the period of June 1, 2008 through May 31, 2009, that pertain to Georgia
fiduciary law and estate planning.'
I. GEORGIA CASES
A.

Attestation of Will by Witnesses
Georgia law requires that a will be attested and subscribed by at least
two competent witnesses in the presence of the testator.2 In 2006 the
Georgia Supreme Court confirmed that the question of whether a
witness is in the testator's presence is determined by applying the "lineof-vision" test.' Under the line-of-vision test, the testator must be able
to see the witness from her location, should he or she so desire, without
* Catherine C. Henson Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law.
Newcomb College of Tulane University (BA, 1974); Emory University School of Law (J.D.,
1981). Former Visiting Professor of Law, Phoenix School of Law, University of Georgia
Law School, University of Tennessee School of Law, and Emory University School of Law.
Reporter, Probate Code Revision Committee, Guardianship Code Revision Committee,
Trust Code Revision Committee of the Fiduciary Section of the State Bar of Georgia. Vice
President, American College of Trust and Estate Counsel. Author, GUARDIANSHIPS AND
CONSERVATORSHIPS IN GEORGIA (2005); REDFEARN: WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA

(7th ed. 2008). The Author wishes to thank Lisamarie Bristol for her research assistance.
1. For analysis of Georgia fiduciary law and estate planning during the prior survey
period, see Mary F. Radford, Wills, Trusts, Guardianships,and FiduciaryAdministration,
Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L. REV. 417 (2008).
2. O.C.G.A. § 53-4-20(b) (1997). The rules for the execution and attestation of wills are
discussed in MARY F. RADFORD, REDFEARN: WILLS & ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA §§ 5:2

to 5:4 (7th ed. 2008).
3. McCormick v. Jeffers, 281 Ga. 264, 266, 637 S.E.2d 666, 669 (2006). This case is
discussed in Mary F. Radford, Wills, Trusts, Guardianshipsand FiduciaryAdministration,
Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 59 MERCER L. REV. 447, 450 (2007).

385

386

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

having to change his or her place.4 In 2009 in Chester v. Smith,5 the
supreme court applied this test and decided that the will in question had
not been validly attested.6 The testator in this case was driven to her
bank by a driver. When the driver of the car parked in the bank
parking lot, the testator called a bank employee who then came out to
the car. The employee read the will to the testator and watched her sign
it. The employee then took the will into the bank, and two tellers signed
as witnesses. The employee and the two tellers all testified at trial that
the testator, who stayed seated in the car, would not have been able to
see the tellers sign due to her place in the car and the structure of the
bank.7 The supreme court affirmed summary judgment against the
propounders of the will on the ground that the witnesses had not signed
the will in the testator's presence.8
Construction of Language Commonly Used in Wills and Trusts
Three cases decided during the survey period examined the meaning
of clauses commonly used by lawyers in both wills and trusts. The first
case involves the testator's tangible personal property and a clause that
contains precatory language related to the distribution of this property.9
The second case deals with a clause directing the payment of the
testator's debts.'0 The third case addresses a clause that directs a
testamentary trust distribution to the "children" of the testator's son."

B.

1. Distribution of Tangible Personal Property. Many testators
own significant amounts of tangible personal property and are constantly
acquiring more. They have specific recipients of some of these items of
property in mind at the time they write their wills; however, they have
not made up their minds about other items and, obviously, have no way
of predicting what items they actually will own at death. One alternative for these testators is to list as many items as possible in the will,
along with the intended recipients of these items, and then formally

4. McCormick, 281 Ga. at 266, 637 S.E.2d at 669. Some jurisdictions use the
"conscious presence" test, which requires only that the testator be conscious of the witness
through any means; for example, if the testator and witness are within hearing distance
of each other. Id. In McCormick the court expressly rejected this test. Id.
5. 285 Ga. 401, 677 S.E.2d 128 (2009).
6. Id. at 402, 677 S.E.2d at 130.
7. Id., 677 S.E.2d at 129-30.
8. Id. at 402-03, 677 S.E.2d at 130.
9. See Kale v. Wilson, 284 Ga. 536, 668 S.E.2d 729 (2008).
10. See Manders v. King, 284 Ga. 338, 667 S.E.2d 59 (2008).
11. See Elrod v. Cowart, 284 Ga. 869, 672 S.E.2d 616 (2009).
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amend the will every year or so to cover newly acquired items.12 This
alternative, however, is both inefficient and expensive. To deal with this
issue, Georgia lawyers often insert a clause into wills that refers to a

separate list the testator will make and update to state which items
should go to whom.13 This list is not a part of the will and thus is not
legally binding,14 but many testators are satisfied that their family

members and executor will abide by their wishes as set out in the list.
The testator of the will at issue in Kale v. Wilson 5 devised all of her

personal property to her niece but added that the niece was "honor
bound to distribute items I have designated to my loved ones. It is my
intention that she will be given a list before I die and I know I can trust
her to carry out my wishes." s The individual who contested the will
alleged, among other things, that the quoted language created a

condition precedent to the vesting of the niece's interest in the estate
and that this condition had not been fulfilled.17

The supreme court

determined that the testator's will did not contain any express intention
to impose a condition precedent on the niece and thus would not
construe those words as creating one.18 The court noted that the law
does not favor conditions precedent that result in forfeiture. 9

12. See generally RADFORD, supra note 2, § 5:10 (discussing codicils).
13. Id. § 5;11. For example, a will may include the following language:
I may leave with my Will or among my personal papers at the time of my death
a written memorandum setting forth certain items of tangible personal property
which I wish to devise to certain persons. Although I realize that this list is not
legally binding, I request my spouse or my descendants to respect my wishes as
spelled out in this list and I direct my Executor to deliver the property on this
listed to the designated individuals if my spouse or descendants should so consent.
Id. § 17:40(h).
14. The Uniform Probate Code contains a provision that codifies the concept of a
separate memorandum or list and allows it to be admitted "as evidence of the intended
disposition." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-513 (1993). The Georgia probate code does not
contain a similar statutory provision. See O.C.G.A. tit. 53 (1997 & Supp. 2009).
15. 284 Ga. 536, 668 S.E.2d 729 (2008).
16. Id. at 537, 668 S.E.2d at 730.
17. Id. at 536, 668 S.E.2d at 730. The original contest to the will stated that the
testator lacked testamentary capacity and that the niece had subjected the testator to
undue influence and fraud. Id. The contestant later orally moved to amend his petition
to add the objection relating to the so-called condition precedent. Id. The supreme court
agreed that the probate court should have denied the motion because it was not in writing;
however, the supreme court then went on to address the merits of the motion. Id. at
536-37, 668 S.E.2d at 730.
18. Id. at 537, 668 S.E.2d at 730.
19. Id. The court cited O.C.G.A. § 44-6-41 (1991), which provides in part as follows:
"The law favors conditions to be subsequent rather than precedent and to be remediable
by damages rather than by forfeiture." Id.; see Kale, 284 Ga. at 537, 668 S.E.2d at 730.
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2. Payment of Debts. Testators often include directions in their
wills for the executor to pay all the testator's debts.20 This clause is
unnecessary because the law requires the executor to pay any debts
owed by the testator before distributing property to the beneficiaries;21
nevertheless, it is commonly used. If a beneficiary under a will is
specifically devised property (usually real property) that is encumbered
by a debt, such as a lien or mortgage, the question arises as to whether
the beneficiary is entitled to receive the property free and clear (with the
executor paying the encumbrance as a debt of the estate) or to receive
the property subject to the encumbrance.22 If a will is silent on this
point, the common law doctrine of exoneration indicates that the debt is
to be paid from the testator's estate and that the beneficiary is to receive
the property without the encumbrance." Many states have reversed
this doctrine by adopting section 2-607 of the Uniform Probate Code,'
which provides that "[a] specific devise passes subject to any mortgage
interest existing at the date of death, without right of exoneration,
regardless of a general directive in the will to pay debts."' Georgia
has not enacted such a statutory provision, and little case law in this
state has dealt with exoneration.2"
In 2008 in Manders v. King,27 the supreme court explained that
Georgia still adheres to the common law doctrine; however, the court
went on to hold that the doctrine of exoneration did not apply to the

20. See generally RADFORD, supra note 2, § 3:4. For example, the will may contain the
following clause:

I direct my Executor, as soon as feasible, to pay out of the residue of my estate all
of my debts, including any charitable pledges, whether or not enforceable; the
expenses of my last illness, funeral and burial; any debts and claims duly allowed
against my estate; the expenses of administration of my estate; and any taxes

assessed or imposed with respect to my estate or any part thereof, whether or not
passing under this will.
Id. § 17:30, Item I.
21. See O.C.GA. § 53-7-40 (1997).

22. See

RADFORD,

supra note 2, § 12:6 (discussing payment of debts and claims).

23. Id.; see also J. Kraut, Annotation, Right of Heir or Devisee to Have Realty
Exonerated from Lien Thereon at Expense of Personal Estate, 4 A.L.R.3d 1023 (1965 &
Supp. 2009), cited in Manders v. King, 284 Ga. 338, 339, 667 S.E.2d 59, 60 (2008). The

doctrine of exoneration takes various forms but generally applies to the payment of
encumbrances on real property by the personal property of the decedent. See Kraut, supra.
24. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-607 (1993).
25. Id.
26. See Manders, 284 Ga. at 339 & n.1, 667 S.E.2d at 60 & n.1 (citing Killingsworth v.
First Natl Bank of Columbus, 237 Ga. 544, 228 S.E.2d 901 (1976); Raines v. Shipley, 197
Ga. 448, 29 S.E.2d 588 (1944)).
27. 284 Ga. 338, 667 S.E.2d 59 (2008).
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The testator's will directed that the

executor should pay "all [her] just debts ...

without unnecessary

delay."2 9 One of the testator's sons owned a condominium with the
testator as joint tenants with right of survivorship. 30 The testator
executed a promissory note when she purchased the condominium and
secured the loan with the real property. The son became the owner of
the condominium upon his mother's death, but he insisted that the note
was a debt of the estate that must be paid from the estate pursuant to
the directive in his mother's will.3 ' The supreme court disagreed."
The court examined cases from other states and concluded that the
common law doctrine of exoneration does not apply to property that
passes outside probate,' and the directive in the will to pay the
testator's debts did not evidence a clear intent on her part that her
estate should be liable for the payment of the note.m The court also
noted that the son would not be compelled to pay the outstanding
indebtedness on the condominium, but he would have to do so if he
wanted to retain title to the property.35 Alternatively, he could sell the
property, pay off the note, and redeem any remaining equity.36

28. Id. at 339-40, 667 S.E.2d at 60.
29. Id. at 340, 667 S.E.2d at 60 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
30. Id. at 339, 667 S.E.2d at 60. See RADFORD, supra note 2, § 2:3, for a discussion of
joint ownership of real property.
31. Manders, 284 Ga. at 339, 667 S.E.2d at 59-60.

32. Id. at 340, 667 S.E.2d at 60.
33. Id. "Non-probate assets" are assets whose transfer is governed by contract or
statute and not by the terms of the testator's will or the laws of intestate succession. See
RADFORD, supra note 2, §§ 2:3, 2:4 (discussing non-probate assets). The Georgia Supreme

Court explained its rationale specifically as it pertained to property held in joint tenancy
with right of survivorship as follows:
A rationale for the exclusion from the doctrine of exoneration of property that is
the subject of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship is that title to said
property vests in the survivor immediately at the moment of the death of the joint
tenant and is never a part of the estate. As a result, the decedent's personal
representative never has title (compare [O.C.GA.] § 53-8-15 with regard to
property in the decedent's estate) and cannot use the property to discharge the
debts of the decedent. Compare [O.C.G.A.] § 53-4-63, which authorizes the
decedent's personal representative to sell both personalty and real property
contained in an estate in order to pay the debts of the decedent.
Manders, 284 Ga. at 340 n.2, 667 S.E.2d at 60 n.2.
34. Manders, 284 Ga. at 340, 667 S.E.2d at 61.
35. Id. at 341, 667 S.E.2d at 61.
36. Id.
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3. Construction of the Term Children. It is quite common for the
settlor3 7 of an inter vivos trust 38 or the testator, in the case of a
testamentary trust,39 to direct distribution of the trust property to a
class of persons who are generically described, such as the class of
"children" or "descendants."40 Questions have arisen in many cases
over whether these classes are intended to include children or descendants who were adopted41 or born out of wedlock.42
In Elrod v. Cowart," the testator's will created a trust that left
property to, among others, the testator's son for life with the remainder
to "any child or children" of that son." The testator died in 1970."'
The son, who had no biological children of his own, adopted Steven
Cowart in 2004 and then died in 2005. Cowart was age thirty-two at the
time of the adoption.4" The other remainder beneficiaries objected to
47
Cowart taking a portion of the trust property.
The supreme court examined in depth the development of the Georgia
adoption and inheritance laws and concluded that Cowart could take

37. The person who creates a trust is a "settlor," "grantor," or "trustor." O.C.G.A. § 5312-2(7) (1997).
38. An inter vivos (or "living") trust is one that is created by deed during the lifetime
of the settlor. See RADFORD, supra note 2, § 14:4.
39. A testamentary trust is one that is created in a testator's will and thus becomes
effective when the will becomes effective. See id.
40. See RADFORD, supra note 2, § 9:4. For example, a trust may include the following
clause:
Upon the grantor's death, the trustee shall divide the remainder of the trust
estate into as many equal shares as the grantor has children then living and
deceased children with descendants then living. The trustee shall distribute one
such share to each child then living and one share, per stirpes, to the then living
descendants of any deceased child.
Id. § 17:43, Item 4(b).
41. See RADFORD, supra note 2, §§ 7:7, 9:3, and 9:4 for a discussion of these cases.
42. See, e.g., Sardy v. Hodge, 264 Ga. 548, 448 S.E.2d 355 (1994); RADFORD, supra note
2, § 9:5.
43. 284 Ga. 869, 672 S.E.2d 616 (2009).
44. Id. at 869-70, 672 S.E.2d at 617.
45. Id. at 869, 672 S.E.2d at 617.
46. Id. at 870, 672 S.E.2d at 617. The decree of adoption expressly stated that Cowart
was to be the "adopted child" of the son "capable of inheriting his estate according to law."
Id. Other than this statement, the case does not describe what relationship existed
between Cowart and the son. See id. Gay and lesbian couples have been known to use
adoption as a means of bringing their partners into the class of people who may inherit or
take under the terms of a trust. See Deborah L. Jacobs, Adult Adoption a High-Stakes
Means to an Inheritance,N.Y. TIMEs, May 20, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2009/05/21/your-money/estate-planning/21ADOPT.html.
47. Elrod, 284 Ga. at 870, 672 S.E.2d at 617.
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under the terms of the trust because the testator did not express intent
that adult adoptees be excluded from the class of the son's "children." "
The court applied Georgia law as it existed at the time of the testator's
death.4" The court noted that the adoption law of the state was
amended in 1967 to provide that an adopted adult could inherit from
and through the adopted parent in the same manner as someone who
was adopted prior to reaching adulthood. ° A later amendment of the
law in 1975"' (after the date of the testator's death) was viewed by the
court merely as a clarification of the law already in existence. 2 This
later amendment provided that an adopted individual "may also take as
a 'child' of the adopting parent under a class gift made by the will of a
third person."53 The court stated that this laws effect is that extrinsic
evidence cannot be considered; rather, only the four corners of the will
can be considered in determining whether adopted individuals are
expressly excluded from taking as beneficiaries of the testamentary
trust.M

C. Attorney Fees and the Slayer Statute
Georgia law prohibits an individual who feloniously and intentionally
kills another individual from benefiting from the slain individual's estate
or serving as the personal representative of that individual's estate.55
For the killing to be felonious and intentional, it must be shown that the
killing would constitute murder, felony murder, or voluntary manslaughter under Georgia law. 6 A conviction or a guilty plea for one of these

48. Id. at 870-72, 672 S.E.2d at 618-19.
49. Id. at 870, 672 S.E.2d at 618. The court cited its holding in Warner v. First
NationalBank of Atlanta, 242 Ga. 661, 251 S.E.2d 511 (1978), to the effect that absent any
contrary intent expressed in a will, a will is to be construed in accordance with the law in
effect at the testator's death. Elrod, 284 Ga. at 870, 672 S.E.2d at 618 (citing Warner, 242
Ga. at 664, 251 S.E.2d at 513).
50. Elrod, 284 Ga. at 870-71, 672 S.E.2d at 618 (citing 1967 Ga. Laws 803, 804-05).
51. 1975 Ga. Laws 797, 797-99.
52. Elrod, 284 Ga. at 871-72, 672 S.E.2d at 618.
53. 1975 Ga. Laws at 799 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 19-8-19(a)(2) (2004)).
54. Elrod, 284 Ga. at 872, 672 S.E.2d at 618-19.
55. O.C.G.A. § 53-1-5(a) (1997) (referring to probate passing by will or intestacy); see
O.C.G.A. § 33-25-13 (2005) (referring to life insurance proceeds). These statutes are
discussed in detail in RADFORD, supra note 2, § 2:10.
56. O.C.G.A. § 53-1-5(a); see O.C.G.A. § 33-25-13. These crimes are defined in O.C.G.A.
§ 16-5-1 (2007 & Supp. 2009) and O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2 (2007).
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crimes is conclusive evidence that the killing was felonious and intentional.5 7
In Levenson v. Word,5" the testator was murdered in October. In
January of the following year, his wife qualified to serve as executor
under his will. In September a grand jury indicted her for her husband's
murder. The wife quickly retained a law firm to defend her. When she
discovered that the state would seek the death penalty, she retained an
additional firm to help with her defense. The wife agreed to pay a
nonrefundable retainer that would be split between the firms. At that
point, she had transferred to the first firm the life insurance proceeds
and interest in real property. The first firm wrote the second firm a
check for $125,000. After months of claiming her innocence, the wife
finally pleaded guilty to murdering her husband. 9 Louis Levenson,
who was appointed administrator of the estate, sought to recover the
funds paid to the lawyers under the theory that the wife had forfeited
these funds when she murdered her husband.60
The court of appeals affirmed a grant of summary judgment against
Levenson. 61 First, the court pointed out that Levenson had not proved
that the funds used to pay the attorneys' retainers had come from
property the wife inherited from her husband.6 2 Second, the court of
appeals held that even if the funds were inherited from the husband, the
wife had title to them at the time she paid the retainer to the attorneys.63 The court noted that at the time the wife paid the fee, it had
not yet been proved that she feloniously and intentionally killed her
husband.' The forfeiture, according to the court, did not occur until
the date she entered her guilty plea.' Certiorari has been granted in
this case, and it is now pending before the supreme court."

57. O.C.G.A. § 53-1-5(d); see O.C.G.A. § 33-25-13.
58.

294 Ga. App. 104, 668 S.E.2d 763 (2008), cert. granted.

59. Id. at 105-06, 668 S.E.2d at 765. She entered her guilty plea approximately one
year after the indictment. See id. at 106, 668 S.E.2d at 765.
60. Id. at 104, 668 S.E.2d at 764. Levenson brought his claim against the lawyers for
conversion on the theory that they knew or should have known that the wife did not have
title to the money when she paid the retainer to them. Id. at 106, 668 S.E.2d at 765.

61. Id. at 108, 668 S.E.2d at 766.
62.

Id. at 106-07, 668 S.E.2d at 766.

63. Id. at 107, 668 S.E.2d at 766.
64. Id.
65.

Id.

66. Supreme Court of Georgia, 2009 Granted Certioraris, http'J/www.ga.supreme.us
/granted-apps/granted-certs/gc_09.php#S09G0336 (last visited Oct. 22, 2009). Levenson
petitioned the supreme court for a writ of certiorari and that petition was initially denied;
however, on a motion for reconsideration, certiorari was granted. Id.
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CharitableBequests and the Role of the Attorney General
Under Georgia law, the attorney general has the power and standing
to enforce provisions in a trust created for a charitable purpose. 7 In
Cronic v. Baker," the supreme court clarified that the attorney
general's authority applies only to property that is or should be held in
trust and not to outright gifts made for charitable purposes.6 9 In
Cronic the testator's will directed that a trust fund be established for
specified educational purposes and also devised certain sums of money
to three private cemeteries. ° The executor did not establish the
educational trust but rather distributed the trust funds directly to the
residuary beneficiaries under the will. After searching for representatives of the three cemeteries and finding only one, the executor also
distributed the amounts designated for the other two cemeteries to the
residuary beneficiaries. The attorney general sued the executor,
claiming that both sets of testamentary gifts envisioned the creation of
charitable trusts and that the executor had breached his fiduciary duty
by not funding those trusts.7 1
The supreme court held that the attorney general had standing to
enforce the creation of the educational trust but not the funding of the
bequests to the cemeteries.72 The court examined the wording of these
bequests and found no evidence of an intent to create a trust, no named
trustee, and no description of any active duties that the trustee should
perform.73 Determining that the words of the will were clear and
unambiguous, the court also refused to consider extrinsic evidence that
the testator intended to create trusts for the cemeteries.74

D.

67. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-115 (1997). "Subjects of charity" under Georgia law include the
relief of poverty, education, the advancement of ethics and religion, health, the
improvement or repair of cemeteries and tombstones, preventing cruelty to animals,
governmental purposes, and "other subjects having for their purpose the relief of human
suffering or the promotion of human civilization." O.C.G.A. § 53-12-110 (1997).
68. 284 Ga. 452, 667 S.E.2d 363 (2008).
69. Id. at 453-54, 667 S.E.2d at 365.
70. Id. at 452, 667 S.E.2d at 364-65. Note that the improvement or repair of
cemeteries is considered a charitable purpose under Georgia law. O.C.G. § 53-12-110(5).
71. Cronic, 284 Ga. at 452-53, 667 S.E.2d at 364-65.
72. Id. at 453, 667 S.E.2d at 365.
73. Id. at 453-54, 667 S.E.2d at 365. The court noted that these are essential elements
of a trust under Georgia law pursuant to O.C.CA. § 53-12-20(b) (1997). Cronic, 284 Ga.
at 453, 667 S.E.2d at 365.
74. Cronic, 284 Ga. at 454, 667 S.E.2d at 365-66. In so stating, the court followed its
long-standing rule of refusing to admit extrinsic evidence of intent when the terms of a
document are plain and unambiguous. See RADFORD, supra note 2, § 7:6 & n.6.
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E.

Access to GuardianshipRecords
In 2004 the Georgia General Assembly enacted a revised version of
Title 29 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)7 5 that
covers the guardianship and conservatorship of both minors and
adults. 6 Among other changes, the new law codified provisions that
previously appeared only in the Georgia Uniform Superior Court
Rules 77 and Georgia Uniform Probate Court Rules"8 pertaining to the
privacy of court files relating to guardianships and conservatorships. 9
The presumption is that court records are generally public and thus
available for public inspection; however, the court rules and the new law
recognize that guardianship and conservatorship records usually contain
highly personal and private information about a vulnerable individual,
and therefore, limiting access to these records is justified.' Consequently, O.C.G.A. § 29-9-1881 restricts access to guardianship and
conservatorship records for all but the minor, the minor's parents, the
ward, the guardian and conservator, and the legal counsel of all these
persons.8 2 Access to the records by any other "interested parties" is
subject to court order and will be granted only if "the public interest in
granting access to the sealed records clearly outweighs 3the harm
otherwise resulting to the privacy of the person in interest."
Under O.C.G.A. § 29-9-18(b), the probate judge may limit the portion
of the fie to which access is granted "to meet the legitimate needs of the
petitioner."' In Sharpton v. Hall," a case of first impression, the court

75.
76.

2004 Ga. Laws 161 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. tit. 29 (2007 & Supp. 2009)).
See id. The extent and effect of this revision of Title 29 is discussed in detail in
MARY F. RADFORD, GUARDIANSHIPS AND CONSERVATORSHIPS IN GEORGIA (2005). Under the
revised law, a "guardian" is an individual appointed by the court to make personal
decisions for the minor or adult ward, such as where to live or whether to obtain medical
treatment. Id. § 1-5; see O.C.G.A. § 29-1-1(7) (2007). A "conservator" is one who is
appointed to handle the property of the minor or adult ward. RADFORD, supra § 1-5; see

O.C.G.A. § 29-1-1(2) (2007).
77. GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 21.2.
78. GA. UNIF. PROB. CT. R. 17.
79. See 2004 Ga. Laws at 311 (codified as amended at O.C.GA. § 29-9-18 (2007 & Supp.
2009)); Sharpton v. Hall, 296 Ga. App. 251, 252, 674 S.E.2d 105, 106 (2009) (discussing
Uniform Superior Court Rule 21.2 and Uniform Probate Court Rule 17).
80. See O.C.GA. § 29-9-18; GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 21.2; GA. UNIF. PROB. CT. R. 17.
81. O.C.G.A. § 29-9-18 (2007 & Supp. 2009).
82. Id. § 29-9-18(a).
83. Id. § 29-9-18(b).
84. Id.

85. 296 Ga. App. 251, 674 S.E.2d 105 (2009).
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of appeals examined the limits of this new law." In this case, the
administrator of an estate petitioned for access to the guardianship
records of the decedent's sister, who was an incapacitated adult. The
administrator sought access to these files because he discovered that the
sister's guardian (another sibling) had apparently defrauded the
decedent during life by recording a deed the decedent had given to the
sister's guardian with the understanding that it would not transfer
property until after the decedent died. During the course of a suit to set
aside that deed, the administrator discovered that the guardian also
recorded a deed from his incapacitated sister at about the same time,
and the administrator feared that the guardian may also have defrauded
the sister and breached his fiduciary duty to her. The sister died before
the time of the administrator's lawsuit.8 7 The administrator petitioned
for access to the sister's guardianship records under the theory that they
might have "high evidentiary value" in the lawsuit, the result of which
could have major tax consequences for the decedent's estate.8
The court of appeals affirmed the probate court's order allowing
limited access to the sister's records.8 9 The probate court refused to
allow access to the sister's medical records, and the court of appeals
agreed that the sister retained a privacy interest in those records even
though she was dead.9
However, the probate court allowed the
administrator access to certain enumerated property records given their
evidentiary value and the potential tax consequences. 9 The court of
appeals held that the probate court did not abuse its discretion in
granting this access, noting that "the public interest in protecting
incompetent adults from chicanery on the part of their guardians
outweighs any potential privacy interest of the ward."92
II. GEORGIA LEGISLATION
The only significant act relating to wills, trusts, and fiduciary
administration passed by the General Assembly in 2009 was an act to
authorize the appointment of "associate probate judges."93 Each county
in Georgia has one probate judge who is elected by the people of that

86. See id. at 251, 674 S.E.2d at 105.
87. Id., 674 S.E.2d at 105-06.
88. Id. at 251-52, 674 S.E.2d at 106.
89. Id. at 253, 674 S.E.2d at 107.
90. Id., 674 S.E.2d at 106.
91. Id.
92. Id., 674 S.E.2d at 106-07.
93. Ga. H.R. Bill 495, § 1, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 827,827-29 (codified at O.C.G.A.
§ 15-9-2.1 (Supp. 2009)).
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county.'
The new law, codified at O.C.G.A. § 15-9-2.1, 95 allows each
probate judge to appoint one or more associate probate judges to serve
on a full- or part-time basis at the pleasure of the probate judge.6

An associate probate judge will have the same powers as the probate
judge, and any judgment issued by an associate probate judge will be
considered a final judgment of the probate court for the purposes of
appeal.97 Although not required to be a resident of the county, an
associate probate judge must otherwise meet the same qualifications
required of a probate judge.9 The new law also restricts the ability of
an associate probate judge to practice law and serve as a fiduciary while
serving as an associate judge."

94. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 1, para. 6; O.C.G.A. § 15-9-1 (2008). The Georgia probate
court system is discussed in detail in RADFORD, supra note 2, § 6:1.
95. O.C.G.A. § 15-9-2.1 (Supp. 2009).
96. Id. § 15-9-2.1(a)(1). Compensation of the associatejudge is to be determined by the
probate judge and the governing authority of the county. Id. § 15-9-2.1(a)(4). The associate
judge's term of office will run concurrently with that of the probate judge. Id. § 15-92.1(a)(5).
97. Id. § 15-9-2.1(b).
98. Id. § 15-9-2.1(c). A probate judge must be a United States citizen, a resident of the
county for at least two years prior to election, a registered voter, and a high school
graduate or its equivalent, and the judge must not have been convicted of any felony
offense or crime of moral turpitude. O.C.G.A. § 15-9-2(a)(1)(A)--(C), (E)-(F) (2008). In most
counties, the probate judge must be at least twenty-five years old. Id. § 15-9-2(a)(1)(D).
In counties with populations of more than 96,000, the probate judge has the authority to
hold jury trials and has expanded jurisdiction if the judge is at least age thirty and has
been admitted to the practice of law for seven years preceding his or her election. O.C.G.A.
§ 15-9-4(b) (2008 & Supp. 2009); see also RADFORD, supra note 2, § 6:1 (discussing the
difference in jurisdiction and authority of probate judges in smaller counties as opposed to
those in counties with populations over 96,000).
99. O.C.G.A. § 15-9-2.1(e). A full-time associate judge may not engage in any practice
of law while serving. Id. A part-time associate judge may not be involved, either directly
or through a partner, in any case in that associate judge's own court or over which that
court has or could have jurisdiction. Id. Associate judges may not give advice or counsel
on any matter related to a case that has arisen in his or her own court. Id. As for service
as a fiduciary, an associate probate judge is restricted in the same manner as a probate
judge. Id. A probate judge may not
during his term of office, be executor, administrator, or guardian, or other agent
of a fiduciary nature required to account to his court. When any person holding
such trust is elected judge of the probate court, his letters and powers immediately
abate upon his qualification. However, a judge of the probate court may be an
administrator, guardian, or executor in a case where the jurisdiction belongs to
another county or in a special case where he is allowed by law and required to
account to the judge of the probate court of another county.
O.C.G.A. § 15-9-2(b) (2008). The Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits all judges from
acting as fiduciaries except for the estates, trusts, or persons of members of their families.
GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5D (2004).
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Prior to the enactment of the new law authorizing the appointment of
associate probate judges, the O.C.G.A. contained a complex scheme for
filling any temporary vacancy in the office of probate judge.o Under
the new law, the senior full-time associate probate judge is first in line
to fill a vacancy and may hold the office for the remainder of the probate
judge's unexpired term.'

If the associate probate judge remains a

resident of the county, the associate probate judge may run to succeed
himself or herself indefinitely."°

100. See O.C.G.A. § 15-9-10 (2008); O.C.GA. § 15-9-11 (2008 & Supp. 2009); O.C.G.A.
§ 15-9-11.1 (2008). In the event of a vacancy, if the chief clerk of the probate court met the
qualifications for the office of probate judge, the chief clerk would fill the position and hold
it until the next general election that occurred more than sixty days after the vacancy or
the expiration of the judge's remaining term, whichever occured first. Id. § 15-9-11.1. If
the chief clerk did not meet the qualifications for the office of a probate judge, the chief
judge of the city or state court or, if none, the clerk of the superior court, would fill the
vacancy. O.C.GA. § 15-9-10. If the clerk could not serve, the chief judge of the superior
court would appoint someone to fill the vacancy. Id. § 15-9-10(a). Whoever filled the
vacancy was then required within ten days to order a special election. O.C.GA. § 15-9-11.
Further, if the vacancy occurred after January 1 of the last year of the probate judge's term
of office, the individual who filled the vacancy would serve the remainder of the unexpired
term of office. Id.
101. O.C.GA § 15-9-2.1(f).
102. Id. The associate probate judge who fills the vacancy need not be a resident of the
county. Id. However, that individual must become a resident of the county if he or she
wishes to run in an election to succeed himself or herself. Id.

